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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK Loop: WHY No STATE
INSTITUTION TYPICALLY RESOLVES WHETHER A LAW IS




It is hardly novel to note that the federal and state constitutions are
the supreme law of their respective domains.' In practice, however, that
supremacy may be largely theoretical. The goal of this Article is to ex-
plain why that is so and to briefly examine the implications of that con-
clusion. The questions explored here underlie some of the most contro-
versial issues surrounding the interplay of the three branches of govern-
ment.2 While the legal and policy implications of a particular decision
often generate much analysis-not to mention vitriol, how the structural
and institutional framework that guides the decision-making of each of
the various branches affects those outcomes is not often examined in a
systematic way. This Article seeks to do so.
Although legislators, judges, and executive branch officials, includ-
ing governors and attorneys general, take oaths to defend the state and
federal constitutions,3 rarely will any of the institutions of state govern-
ment prevent a statute whose constitutionality they question-or even
doubt-from going into or remaining in effect. Instead, they will defer to
the statute over the constitution. This Article seeks to explain why that is
so, and what, if anything, should be done about it. While these issues
arise in every jurisdiction, both state and federal, because Colorado has
had a number of recent experiences that illustrate these issues particular-
ly well, and because of the author's close familiarity with the practice in
Colorado, the Article uses Colorado as its example.
t Solicitor General, State of Colorado; Adjunct Professor, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
State of Colorado, the Department of Law, or the Office of the Attorney General.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Colo. State Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Love, 448 P.2d 624,
628 (Colo. 1968) ("An amendment to the constitution is the solemn final exercise of the sovereignty
which belongs to the People of the State of Colorado. Neither executive order, nor legislative enact-
ment, nor judicial decision can be permitted to render futile this expressed will of the People.");
People v. W. Union Tel. Co., 198 P. 146, 148 (Colo. 1921).
2. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765-66 (2008); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133,
142-44 (1st Cir. 2003); Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Hon. John Boehner, Speaker
of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/February/i I -ag-223.html [hereinafter Holder Letter].
3. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 2(2) (legislators); id. art. XII, §§ 8-9 (civil officers and
judges).
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It is worth emphasizing what this Article is not about. It is not about
which substantive theory of constitutional interpretation courts or others
should use when they go about answering what this Article will refer to
as "constitutional questions"-questions about whether a law is contrary
to the constitution. That is, the Article does not argue for or against
textualism, originalism, original meaning, original intent, living constitu-
tionalism, active liberty, or any other theory of substantive constitutional
interpretation.4 The Article is about what burden of proof or persuasion
institutions do and should apply when using whichever method of sub-
stantive interpretation they choose to resolve constitutional questions. In
other words, the Article explores how much deference state institutions
give to sister institutions, and how much doubt institutions can have
about a law's constitutionality before they will use their authority to pre-
vent its going into or remaining in effect.
First, the Article introduces the idea of a continuum of constitution-
ality-a graphical representation of the various levels of doubt or defer-
ence that a reviewing institution (or individual) could apply in drawing
the line at which its concerns about a law's constitutionality will out-
weigh its reasons for letting the law go into effect. The Article next ex-
plains the current practice of the institutions that typically address consti-
tutional questions: the courts, the Attorney General's Office, the general
assembly, and the governor. For a number of reasons, each of these insti-
tutions generally takes a deferential view of the constitutional questions
they face, applying a high burden of persuasion on anyone posing the
question. Each of these institutions thus will typically enact, sign, en-
force, defend, and uphold a law about which they may harbor even fairly
serious constitutional doubts. Only when those doubts cross a high
threshold will one of these institutions seek to impose the stated superior-
ity of the constitution.
Having described the current practice, the last part of the Article
turns to the normative question of whether each institution's practice is
appropriate given a goal of minimizing constitutional error. The Article
posits that the current situation can, and often does, create something of a
feedback loop: the judiciary and attorney general defer to the policy
branches' 6 judgments, and the policy branches take that deference into
4. This is a heavily-tread path of scholarship. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980); INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
(Jack Rakove, ed., 1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997).
5. See discussion infra Part II. Courts and others use different terms, including "burden of
proof' or "standard of review" to describe the concept of how convinced an institutional actor must
be about a law's unconstitutionality before taking action against it, but I believe "burden of persua-
sion" is the most accurate phrase, and will generally use it in this Article.
6. See infra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons to group the governor
and legislature together as the "policy branches").
162 [Vol. 89:1
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK LOOP
account in making their judgments, and thus, in effect, give themselves
deference. Rarely does anyone in these institutions ask the fundamental
question, "Is this law constitutional?" Instead, in most instances, they
give laws the benefit of the doubt over the ostensibly supreme constitu-
tion.
The Article concludes, however, that for the most part this is entire-
ly proper. The judiciary and attorney general could, theoretically, be less
deferential, but for many reasons the costs would outweigh the benefits.
On the other hand, the policy branches should be encouraged to make
their decisions truly independent of the deference the rest of the system
gives them. In fact, those branches should consider adopting something
close to an inverse of the standard the others apply to them: the more
deference they get from other institutions, the less they should give
themselves. The Article suggests one small but potentially important
concrete institutional change that could help them to do so. But for the
most part, the Article recognizes that viable, concrete, enforceable
measures are few. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that members
of the policy branches will recognize the problem, resolve to take less
deference for themselves, and give more to the constitution, a parchment
barrier though it may be.
I. THE CONTINUUM OF CERTAINTY AND DEFERENCE: WHAT
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS ACTUALLY ASK WHEN THEY FACE A
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Is a particular law constitutional? While in some theoretical sense
every law is either constitutional or unconstitutional, the human beings
and human institutions that have to answer this question often have to
operate in an area of doubt, as many statutes raise at least some question
about their compatibility with various constitutional commands.7 In all
but the simplest of cases, the real world of constitutional analysis does
not fit into a simple binary paradigm. It therefore will be useful to posit a
"continuum of constitutionality". This continuum seeks to make graph-
ical some fairly common concepts about how the legal system resolves
constitutional questions.
7. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473-75 (1987) (describing the general debate about whether law is determinate at
all and noting that while there may be some easy questions, the law is often either indeterminate or
underdeterminate; that is, that the law leaves room for debate and doubt about how to properly
resolve a case). Whether law is determinate at all is a question that need not be resolved here-
simply noting that there are at least some hard cases is enough. This is particularly true given the
complex and expansive body of federal constitutional case law that has developed over the last
century, and the complex and expansive body of codified constitutional law that is the Colorado
Constitution.
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The continuum would look something like this:
Undoubtedly -- Clearly - Probably 4 50/50 4 Probably - Clearly 4 Undoubtedly
Constitutional Unconstitutional
At either end of the continuum are the easy cases in which there can
be no doubt regarding constitutionality: the law is undoubtedly constitu-
tional or undoubtedly unconstitutional. At the next step toward the center
are laws that may raise a minimal doubt, but one that can be dismissed as
unreasonable on closer inspection. A step nearer the center are clearly
constitutional or clearly unconstitutional laws. Further toward the middle
are laws for which the answer can only be given as a preponderance: the
law is probably constitutional or probably unconstitutional. Dead in the
middle would be a true 50-50 question.
As a theoretical matter, an institution or individual could choose to
draw the line at which it will deem the law unconstitutional anywhere
along this continuum.8 And in fact, in actual practice, our system applies
different standards or burdens in different circumstances. In criminal
law, for example, juries may not convict unless the defendant has been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.9 This high burden would be at
the far right on a similar continuum, but with "Innocent" and "Guilty"
replacing "Constitutional" and "Unconstitutional." In other situations,
the tipping point is further to the left. Terminating the parent-child legal
relationship, for example, requires "clear and convincing" evidence.' 0
Even nearer to the middle is the standard used in typical civil suits: pre-
ponderance of the evidence, or more probable than not."
The continuum could also be couched in probabilities:
0 4 10 -)20 -)30 440 -*50 -*60 -*70 -)80 -*90 - 100
Probably Constitutional Probably Unconstitutional
Here, one would understand that the number represents the likeli-
hood that a given law would be found unconstitutional, or perhaps that it
represents the percentage of neutral observers who would find the law
unconstitutional.
8. Of course, the implications of such a decision will differ based on the institution. If it is
one of the policy branches, it would mean not enacting or not signing an unconstitutional law. For
the attorney general, it might mean publicly denouncing a law or even challenging one in court. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (Colo. 2003). For the courts, it would
mean issuing a declaratory judgment and perhaps an injunction.
9. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
10. People ex rel. A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 251 (Colo. 2010).
I1. See id ("The clear and convincing evidence standard requires proof by more than a 'pre-
ponderance of the evidence,' but it is more easily met than the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard
used in criminal proceedings." (citing People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1136 (Colo. 1980))).
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Another way to picture the continuum is purely numerically:
0 4 1 2 -) 3 4 4 - 5 4 6 4 7 4 8 -- 9 4 10
Probably Constitutional Probably Unconstitutional
Here, the number could be viewed as representing the likelihood
that the law in question is unconstitutional. A "1 case" would be some-
thing that nobody could doubt is constitutional. A "2 case" might have
some very minimal questions, but nothing remotely serious. For exam-
ple, a law declaring that slavery is forbidden would be a 1 or 2 at most. A
"5 case" would, again, be a toss-up in which the arguments weigh equal-
ly in favor and against constitutionality. A "6 case" would be a prepon-
derance of the weight in favor of a finding of unconstitutionality. An "8
case" might correspond to having no reasonable doubt that the law is
unconstitutional, and a "10 case" would correspond to having absolutely
no doubt at all that it is unconstitutional (for example, a law that declares
the voting age to be 30).
Whichever continuum one finds most useful, they all reflect that the
higher the standard (the further to the right), the more doubt about a
law's constitutionality one will be accepting. In the familiar language of
criminal law, an institution that applies a high burden is electing to let
some number of guilty defendants (or, in our case, unconstitutional laws)
go free, and the further to the right on the continuum one chooses to
draw the line, the more guilty men, or laws, will go free. Any line to the
right of a "1" will mean that there is some doubt about a law's compati-
bility with a constitutional provision. Where our various institutions
choose to draw their lines-how they choose to deal with that doubt-
and why, is the subject of the next section.
II. THE STATUS Quo: How GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS ANSWER
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
There are four institutions in state government that generally are or
can be involved in assessing the constitutionality of a proposed or enact-
ed law: the courts, the Attorney General's Office, the general assembly,
and the governor. This section discusses the way each of these institu-
tions goes about making these assessments. Since the general assembly
and the governor generally have similar institutional concerns and con-
straints, and use the same standards, and since the same arguments dis-
cussed below apply equally to them, they will be treated together as the
"policy branches."' 2
12. The phrase "political branches" is commonly used to describe the legislative and execu-
tive branches in the federal system (and often the state system). See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renour-
2011] 165
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A. The Courts
1. Post-enactment
The standard that Colorado's judiciary declares that it applies to
constitutional challenges to laws that have been enacted by the policy
branches is well-established, clearly-stated, and highly deferential: "It is
an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed
to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden
of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 3 "The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt showing necessary to over-
come that presumption 'acknowledges that declaring a statute unconstitu-
tional is one of the gravest duties impressed upon the courts."'4
As the continuums above highlight, the implication of this, howev-
er, is that our courts do not in fact declare that laws are constitutional. It
is more accurate to view a decision upholding a law as acquitting the law
of the allegation that it is unconstitutional. And just as a not guilty ver-
dict does not necessarily mean the jury found that the defendant was in-
nocent,15 an "acquittal" of a statute does not necessarily mean the court
believes the law does not violate the constitution; it simply means that
ishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2614 (2010); Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 537 (1952); Keating v. Johnson, 918 P.2d 51, 59 (Okla. 1996). I have decided to instead
use "policy branches" for two reasons. First, it is important for purposes of this Article to keep in
mind that Colorado has a non-unitary executive branch. The attorney general, while part of the
executive branch, is independent and has little policy-making role. The general assembly and the
governor are the institutions that make policy. And to the extent "political branches" might carry a
pejorative connotation that the activities of those branches are motivated by cynical political motives
above all else, I hope the new phrase makes clear that no such criticism is intended. (I do not believe
there should be such a connotation even with "political" branches; that phrase should be read as a
recognition that the executive and legislative branches are politically accountable, not an accusation
that they necessarily act out of purely electoral motives.)
Even "policy branches" is an imperfect appellation, of course, since only part of the executive
"branch"-the governor (and not the attorney general, secretary of state, or treasurer)-is actually
covered by the phrase as used here. I have not been able to develop a better metaphor for a part of
the branch, however, ("political twigs" seems inappropriate) so "policy branches" it is herein.
13. People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) (citing People v. Summit, 517 P.2d
850, 852 (Colo. 1974); People v. Prante, 493 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Colo. 1972)); see also Walton v.
Walton, 278 P. 780, 790 (Colo. 1929) (Butler, J., dissenting) ("This court declares that the provision
is unconstitutional, which means, of course, that its conflict with the Constitution is so clear as to be
beyond any reasonable doubt.").
14. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 527 (Colo. 2009) (quoting City
of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.
2000)).
15. See People v. Allee, 740 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. 1987) ("[A]n acquittal establishes a legal status
of innocence that conceptually can be distinct from a factual status of innocence. . .. 'A verdict of
acquittal does not establish a status of innocence. Innocence, while it entitles one to an acquittal, is
not always present where a verdict of not guilty is returned. If the jury has a reasonable doubt of
guilt under all the evidence, even if defendant is in fact guilty, it is its duty to acquit. Innocence is a
factual status. Nonliability to account resulting from acquittal is a legal status."') (quoting Roberts v.
People, 87 P.2d 251, 255 (Colo. 1938))). One could likewise say that constitutionality is a factual
status while validity (or non-invalidity) is a legal status. Courts resolve the legal status of validity,
but not the factual status of constitutionality. If the defense can create reasonable doubts, a law can
violate the constitution without being overturned, just as one can commit a crime without being
convicted.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK LOOP
the party challenging the law failed to meet the high burden of showing
the law is unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Precisely what "beyond a reasonable doubt" means can be difficult
to define,' 6 and to my knowledge, the Colorado Supreme Court has not
articulated what it means in the constitutional context. Researchers have
in fact attempted to quantify the concept of "reasonable doubt" as used in
criminal cases.17 Other scholars, however, believe the concept cannot be
quantified.'8 Courts have generally agreed with the latter view and resist-
ed attempts to quantify the concept.19 In the criminal context, it has been
defined as "such a doubt as would cause reasonable people to hesitate to
act in matters of importance to themselves." 2 0 The U.S. Supreme Court
has "repeatedly approved" this formulation. 2 1 One could, perhaps, imag-
ine a higher standard in theory. If the continuum were converted to a
numerical one, for example, "beyond a reasonable doubt" would rate
perhaps an 8, with 9 being "moral certainty" and 10 being absolute scien-
22tific or mathematical certainty. But it is not necessary for purposes of
this Article to settle upon a definition of reasonable doubt. Suffice to say
that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is, as the continuum above shows, "the
highest standard of proof' in the law. 23 In other words, it is the most def-
erential standard a court could realistically apply to constitutional ques-
tions.
The courts' stated standard is therefore as near to the right of the
continuum of constitutionality as any standard used in the law. There is
some dispute, even within the supreme court itself, about how high the
"reasonable doubt" standard is in state constitutional challenges, and
whether the court actually applies the standard consistently in practice. 24
There is also some dispute about whether reasonable doubt is the proper
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof A View from
the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 319, 319 (1971); Katie Evans, David
Osthus & Ryan G. Spurrier, Distributions of Interest for Quantifying Reasonable Doubt and Their
Applications, http://www.valpo.edu/mcs/pdf/ReasonableDoubtFinal.pdf 3-4 (last visited Sept. 22,
2011) (advocating for a new method to quantify reasonable doubt because of deficiencies in previous
studies that have concluded that juries typically will convict if the probability of guilt is above .70-
.74).
18. See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
412 (1980) ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a quantum without a number.").
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988). Courts likewise have
been reluctant to quantify the important concepts of "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause."
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). It seems safe to say that the two are fairly
near the center of this continuum and may straddle it.
20. COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 3:04 (1993).
21. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 20 (1994).
22. Cf id. (appearing to hold that a doubt need not be "substantial" or "grave" to be reasona-
ble).
23. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 186 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. See Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 539 (Colo. 2009) (Eid, J.,
dissenting) (discussing "major concerns ... about the majority's application of the presumption of
constitutionality" because the highly deferential approach may not always apply in practice).
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standard at all. 25 But if we take the court at its word, then it is applying a
very high standard, as high as any used anywhere in the law. As it has
been imported from the criminal law, it is a standard in fact designed so
that some guilty men (or laws, in this case) will go free.26
This presumption of constitutionality flows from the deference the
court affords the legislature in its law making functions. While the extent
of that deference is perennially debated,2 7 there is little dispute that some
judicial deference is necessary in a democratic society.28 A reviewing
court must assume that the "legislative body intends the statutes it adopts
to be compatible with constitutional standards." 29
Alexander Bickel's book, The Least Dangerous Branch, provides
the classic explanation of the problems that a less deferential standard
can create. Judicial review, he states, has a "tendency over time seriously
to weaken the democratic process.,30 Bickel quotes James Bradley
Thayer's statement:
[T]he exercise of it [the power of judicial review], even when una-
voidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the cor-
rection of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people
thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimu-
lus that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way,
and correcting their own errors. The tendency of a common and easy
resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf
25. See, e.g., Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 636 n.15 (10th Cir. 1998)
("The court below, and the plaintiffs themselves, assumed ... that the plaintiffs must prove the
unconstitutionality of [the law in question] 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' This circuit has never
applied such a standard of proof to a purely legal question of whether a statute is facially unconstitu-
tional." (citations omitted)). But see United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1004 (10th Cir. 2001)
("When reviewing a statute alleged to be vague, courts must indulge a presumption that it is consti-
tutional, and the statute must be upheld unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that
the legislature went beyond the confines of the Constitution." (quoting United States v. Day, 223
F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000)) (intemal quotation marks omitted)).
26. See Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174-78 (1997) (containing
an amusing but fascinating attempt to catalogue and put in historical context the various numbers
that have been chosen to fill in the blank in the hoary statement: It is better that guilty men go
free than one innocent man be convicted).
27. See David M. Burke, The "Presumption of Constitutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist
Court: A Lethal Combination for Individual Liberty, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 75-77 (1994)
(arguing against judicial deference); Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case
Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1090
(2005) (arguing against Professor Randy Barnett's argument that "a law should only be invalidated
by courts as unconstitutional if it represented a clear mistake").
28. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 22-26 (1989); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230-31 (2006).
29. Mesa Cnty., 203 P.3d at 527 (quoting Meyer v. Lamm, 846 P.2d 862, 876 (Colo. 1993)).
30. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 21 (1962).
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the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility. 3'
That is to say, every judicial invalidation of a democratically-
approved law has two related problems. First, it is in tension with the
fundamental concept that the three branches of government are co-equal.
As Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury v. Madison,32 of
course, the point of a binding, written constitution is precisely to limit the
impulses of pure democracy.33 Thus, it is nearly universally accepted that
judicial review is legitimate despite the problems discussed above. But it
is almost as nearly universally accepted that those problems do impose
on courts a requirement that they give deference to the democratic
branches and presume that the laws they pass are constitutional unless it
is not possible to conclude otherwise. No matter how much the other
branches may believe a law they have passed to be constitutional, the
courts' decisions on such questions are, of course, final.34
Second, courts are not democratically selected, though in Colorado
there are some democratic means of controlling egregious judicial excess
(however rarely that power may be invoked).35 If democratic laws can be
stricken by undemocratic courts, this is fundamentally at odds with the
idea that we are a democratic republic. Many have recognized that dem-
ocratic laws being stricken by undemocratic courts is fundamentally at
odds with the idea of a democratic republic. In President Lincoln's
words, "[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting
the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court, ... the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to
that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal."36 Or as Justice Frankfurter put it, "Because the powers
exercised by [the courts] are inherently oligarchic, . . . the implications of
that right [of judicial review] and the conditions for its exercise must
constantly be kept in mind and vigorously observed."37
Finally, Professor Nagel has powerfully argued that a lack of judi-
cial deference to other political institutions "weaken[s] the capacity of
the political culture to develop moral understandings and to initiate wise
31. Id. at 22 (second alteration in original) (quoting J. B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07
(1901)).
32. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. Id. at 176-77.
34. Id. at 177-78. But see Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 (E.D. Va.
2009) (describing "the scheme of separation of powers" as that "in which Congress passes laws, the
President enforces them, and the judiciary interprets them").
35. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25.
36. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
37. Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S. 538, 555, 557 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). Frankfurter's opinion also quotes Thomas Jefferson's statements that "the Court [is]
'an irresponsible body' and 'independent of the nation itself", and provides citations to a number of
"similar expressions of Jefferson's alarm at what he felt to be the dangerous encroachment of the
judiciary upon the other functions of govemment." id. at 555 & n. 16.
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change."3 Thus, "to an unexpected extent judicial restraint may be nec-
essary to a stable constitutional order." 9
2. Pre-enactment: Interrogatories
Another quirk of Colorado's constitutional structure that distin-
guishes it from the federal system and highlights the rationale for defer-
ential standards in the typical case is the Colorado Constitution's approv-
al of advisory opinions. Article VI, § 3 of the state constitution in fact
mandates that, "The supreme court shall give its opinion upon important
questions upon solemn occasions when required by the governor, the
senate, or the house of representatives."40
Given the reasons for deference listed above, it should not be sur-
prising that the supreme court will not apply the presumption of constitu-
tionality when its view on proposed legislation is sought via this inter-
rogatory or advisory opinion.4 1 Thus, the court in these cases actually
engages in a de novo review of the constitutional question.
This makes perfect sense: if the political branches have not yet en-
acted a law-and indeed are themselves so unsure of the law's constitu-
tionality that they seek the supreme court's input-most, if not all, of the
reasons for the presumption and deference discussed above do not ob-
tain. Because the policy branches themselves have voluntarily sought out
the court's opinion, there is no violation of the concept of three co-equal
branches. A judicial ruling on an interrogatory does nothing to diminish
the dignity of the other branches.4 2 Similarly, because by definition when
the courts are asked to answer a constitutional question about a proposed
law through the interrogatory process, they will not be overruling a dem-
ocratically-approved law, and the countermajoritarian concern fades
away.
In sum, courts are generally deferential to laws enacted by the polit-
ical branches. Their position is that they will not strike down a law if its
constitutionality is questionable, or even if the judges believe it is proba-
38. NAGEL, supra note 28, at 7.
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id. art. VI, § 3. Colorado is apparently one of only eight states with such a provision. Mel
A. Topf, State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review, 2001 L. REV.
MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 101 n.1 (2001).
41. See In re Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo. 1999) (refusing
to give presumption "because the bill in question has not been passed and the legislature has certified
to us that they are not certain of its constitutionality").
42. If the advisory opinion process does not present the same "counter-majoritarian" or "anti-
democratic" problems that judicial review of enacted legislation does, it could nevertheless be ar-
gued that the process undermines the separation of powers that marks our form of constitutional
republicanism. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004). But, like the splintered executive, this is
another area in which our state constitution strikes a different balance than that of the national con-
stitution. It can also be argued that deference is not proper where the political branches themselves
are in dispute about the constitutionality of a law. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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bly unconstitutional. Only if the law is clearly unconstitutional will
courts stand in its way. In other words, the courts have decided that it is
better that some number of unconstitutional laws go into effect-go
free-than that one constitutional law be invalidated.4 3
This means that, in typical litigation, courts do not declare that laws
are constitutional. When a law is upheld, the court is declaring only that
it is not undoubtedly unconstitutional. (The triple, perhaps quadruple,
negative is, unfortunately, necessary-and, I believe, accurate-here.) If
the court is in doubt about a law's constitutionality, the law generally is
to be upheld in court.
B. The Attorney General's Office
Like the judiciary, the Office of the Attorney General is faced with
many difficult constitutional questions." Just in the past few years, for
example, our office has had to consider whether a ban on indoor smoking
violated the First or Fourteenth Amendments, whether a state residency
requirement for concealed weapons permits violates the Second
Amendment, whether an effort to ban political contributions from hold-
ers of certain government contracts violated the First Amendment,
whether efforts to collect taxes on products purchased over the internet
violated the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause, whether various new
and increased "fees" violated the state Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, and
whether a proposal to appropriate $500 million from a state-chartered
insurance company's reserves violated the state's ban on retrospective
legislation. In fact, given that not all questionable proposals become law,
the Office of the Attorney General confronts constitutional questions
more often than the courts. It turns out that in the end, however, the of-
fice's approach is similarly deferential in most situations: we defend
many laws that, if we were providing an academic analysis of them ra-
ther than acting as a constitutional and statutory arm of the government,
we would conclude are likely unconstitutional. While, for the reasons
explained below, this is inevitable and preferable to any other possible
system, it is important for others in the system and for the people of Col-
orado to understand that it is the case, and why.
Unlike those of the judiciary, the standards applied by the Attorney
General's Office in answering constitutional questions generally have not
been clearly spelled out in public documents. But otherwise the two are
similar in many ways. The standard the office applies in most cases is
highly deferential-indeed, it is usually at least as deferential to the poli-
cy branches as the courts' standard. And also like the courts, the office
43. Cf Volokh, supra note 26, at 174-78.
44. As Solicitor General, my overarching role is to supervise how the office addresses consti-
tutional and legal questions. This requires extensive oversight of the state's appellate litigation and,
as the following examples show, it occasionally also requires me to get involved in responding to
difficult constitutional questions posed during the legislative process.
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also generally treats questions about proposed laws differently than those
already in effect. It will answer constitutional questions more deferential-
ly (to the right on the continuum above) when the law in question has
already been enacted and signed than when it is simply a proposal. As
with the courts, all of this turns on the institutional role of the Office of
the Attorney General within the overall structure of state government.
Colorado, like many other states but unlike the federal government,
separately elects the attorney general rather than allowing him or her to
be appointed by the governor.45 This important fact gives the attorney
general some independence which can, in some circumstances, be used
to block unconstitutional legislation, or at least make it more difficult for
the political branches to enact and enforce legislation. But while this
independence is important, the attorney general, like the courts, is con-
strained by other institutional aspects of the office. And again as with the
courts, this means that, in practice, the attorney general is typically not in
a position to impede the adoption or execution of legislation he believes
may be, or even probably is, unconstitutional.
Under the state constitution, the governor is vested with the "su-
preme executive power of the state," 46 but the attorney general is inde-
pendently elected.47 The constitution, however, is generally silent about
the role of the attorney general within the executive branch; instead, the
attorney general's basic duties are spelled out in statute. Among the most
relevant for purposes of this Article, the attorney general and his subor-
dinates48 are required to "be the legal counsel and advisor of each de-
partment [and other agency] of the state government other than the legis-
lative branch.'A9 The office "shall prosecute and defend for the state all
causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or interested,"50
and "to prosecute and defend all suits relating to matters connected with"
the office of the governor and other major state departments.5 ' State
agencies are forbidden from hiring "any person to perform legal ser-
vices" without the involvement of the office. 52 "When requested," the
attorney general is required to give a formal opinion "in writing upon all
45. See generally NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES, at ix-x (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) (containing a useful background on the
role of state attorneys general); William P. Marshall (later the solicitor general of Ohio), Break up
the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115
YALE L.J. 2446, 2446 (2006) (containing an interesting comparison of the state and federal executive
structures that argues in favor of the independent state attorney general model); Scott M. Matheson,
Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, I
(1993) (containing a useful background on the role of state attorneys general).
46. COLo. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
47. Id art. IV, §§ 1, 4.
48. Which number includes the author. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-31-201(4), -203(1)
(2011).
49. Id. § 24-31-101(1)(a).
50. Id
51. Id § 24-31-101(1)(b).
52. Id § 24-31-203(2).
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questions of law submitted to him by the general assembly or either
house thereof or by the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
executive director of the department of revenue, state treasurer, state
auditor, or commissioner of education."
The attorney general also has independent common-law duties "to
protect the rights of the public" 54 and to appear in court "as the chief
legal officer of the state . . . in the interests of the people to promote the
public welfare."55 The contours of these duties are not well-defined, but
they include things ranging from authoring or joining amicus briefs on
behalf of the State of Colorado to oversight of the sale or transfer of
ownership of nonprofit entities56 to, when necessary, suing to block a law
passed by the legislative and executive branches.57
While this complex regime is fairly well-established and explains
when the Office of the Attorney General may face a constitutional ques-
tion, it does not give much guidance about how the attorney general is to
go about answering it. The many roles the office plays within the gov-
ernmental structure means that the answer to that question often changes
depending on the circumstances. The most important dividing line, as it
is as with the judiciary, is between enacted and proposed legislation.
1. Enacted Legislation.
After legislation has passed, the attorney general's obligation to de-
fend the state's law is the office's overriding obligation and priority.
Thus, we apply a standard similar to the courts' "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Given the office's role as part of the executive branch, however,
our position is if anything slightly more deferential. If, as suggested
above, the courts' standard is an 8 on the continuum of deference, ours
might approach a 9.
We of course will not defend a law that is so clearly unconstitution-
al that we cannot present ethical arguments on its behalf 59 From time to
time we are put in this position. For example, in a recent challenge to
many new aspects of the state's petition and initiative process, while we
continue to defend much of the law, we were forced to confess judgment
53. Id. § 24-31-101(1)(b). In practice, Attorneys General have provided formal opinions to the
heads of other state departments besides those listed in statute.
54. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1229 (Colo. 2003) (quoting People v.
Tool, 86 P. 224, 227 (1905)).
55. Id. at 1230 (quoting State R.R. Comm'n v. People ex rel. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 98 P. 7,
11 (1908)).
56. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Colo. 1993).
57. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1225.
58. A questionable proposition. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. In practice,
the courts' standard seems closer to a 6 or 7.
59. See COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.16 (stating that "a lawyer shall not represent
a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client
if: (1) the representation will result in violation of .. . law").
1732011]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
on one claim was not defensible under existing precedent.60 We may also
refuse to defend, or the governor or other relevant agency may ask us not
to defend, a law if we have taken a position privately, or certainly public-
ly,61 that would significantly undermine our ability to provide a vigorous
defense.6 2 In some instances, an ethical, professionally responsible argu-
ment might be available, but we would nevertheless consider that argu-
ment so unreasonable that we would refuse to advance it. As the U.S.
Attorney General recently declared:
[T]he [United States] Department [of Justice] has a longstanding
practice of defending the constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if
reasonable arguments can be made in their defense, a practice that
accords the respect appropriately due to a coequal branch of govern-
ment. However, the Department in the past has declined to defend
statutes despite the availability of professionally responsible argu-
ments, in part because the Department does not consider every plau-
sible argument to be a 'reasonable' one.63
But these instances are relatively rare. Few laws are so clearly un-
constitutional that an ethical or reasonable argument cannot be put for-
ward in their defense. Thus, we often defend laws about which we have
serious constitutional questions. Likewise, even if we have highlighted
possible constitutional issues with a proposed law for the policy branches
to consider, that will not always require our removal from the defense of
the law if it is enacted.
The reasons for this approach-which is generally consistent with
that of past Colorado attorneys general as well as with attorneys general
60. See Order on Preliminary Injunction, Independence Institute v. Buescher, No. 10-cv-
00609-PAB-MEH (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 2010).
61. See infra Part II.D.2 (containing an example of when an attorney general takes the posi-
tion that a law is unconstitutional).
62. See, e.g., Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 531(Colo. 2009)
(containing an example of when an attorney general takes the position that a law is unconstitutional).
63. Holder Letter, supra note 2. This letter, along with the decision of Attorney General
Salazar that is at issue in People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003), discussed
further below, highlights an important point touched on above, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text, but that bears further emphasis. Settling on a "tipping point" on a continuum of constitutionality
(or declaring a standard to apply) to resolve a constitutional question does not actually resolve the
question. The individual or institution answering the question still must apply some substantive
inquiry into the meaning of the relevant legal and constitutional provisions and other considerations,
such as the weight to give various types of precedents. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Then the level of doubt or confidence with which that substantive inquiry leaves the institution can
be measured against the standard to see which side of the selected tipping point the law falls on. This
means that even if everyone agreed on the proper standard to apply (or proper level of deference),
different individuals will reach different conclusions about where a particular law falls on the con-
tinuum. In this instance, for example, given that at the time the attorney general announced the
U.S.'s refusal to defend some lawsuits (but not others) challenging a particular federal law no federal
court of appeals that had considered the question had used the heightened standard the attorney
general felt was required, it seems unlikely that our office would have reached the same conclusion
that the law was beyond the appropriate standard. Nevertheless, his efforts to grapple with the proper
standard for the government's lawyers to apply is precisely what this Article attempts to do, and his
stated standard is similar if not identical to that applied by the Colorado Attorney General's Office.
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of other states and of the United States-are essentially the same as the
reasons for courts' deference.
Like courts, an attorney general faces institutional constraints on his
ability to stand in the way of laws proposed and adopted by the political
branches that are of questionable constitutionality. Though the Colorado
attorney general is independently elected, the office's role is generally
not a policy-making one. That is left to the policy branches. The system
can only function if this office applies a strong presumption that the poli-
cy branches have carried out their duty to uphold the constitutions. If the
attorney general were to block or even simply refuse to defend any laws
she believed might be unconstitutional, the office would no longer be
able to function as it is required by the constitution and state statute. The
office would instead turn into something of preemptive court, arbitrating
constitutional questions rather than defending the state's laws. This
would be a marked agglomeration of power that traditionally has been
understood to rest in the policy branches (particularly the legislative
branch).64 Tempting as this may be for those in the office, it is not a
proper use of the office except in the rarest of circumstances.6 Policy-
making must be left to the policy branches, and as long as those branches
have carried out their duty to study the constitutionality of a proposed
law, the attorney general should defer to that judgment in all but the most
extreme cases.
64. See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (stating that the practice of the Attorney General's Office
is to defend the "constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in
their defense, a practice that accords the respect appropriately due to a coequal branch of govern-
ment").
65. Salazar is the most controversial recent example. Others in Colorado include the claim
mentioned in note 60, supra, and accompanying text and the position taken in In re Interrogatories
on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1999), in which the attorney general, on behalf of the
governor, argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Citizen United could only be read as invali-
dating certain portions of Colorado's campaign finance laws. The office, in consultation with the
governor and other state agencies, will also often abandon defenses of laws or regulations if they
have been invalidated in court. See, e.g., Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1253
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding several Colorado statutes unconstitutional because they violate the First
Amendment); see also H.B. 1267, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009) (changing the
Colorado statutes found unconstitutional in Colorado Christian University, 534 F.3d 1245). As
noted above, the U.S. attorney general has recently declined to defend a federal law, despite a fairly
successful record on the matter previously. See Holder Letter, supra note 2. That this move appears
to be out of the ordinary, and certainly appears to be based on a different standard than traditionally
applied by Colorado attorneys general, may explain at least some of the criticism of the decision.
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-grab-in-
the-decision-not-to-defend-doma/. Others, however, have pointed out that while rare it is hardly
unprecedented for the U.S. Department of Justice to refuse to defend a federal law. Seth P. Waxman,
Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1074-75 (2001). In any case, these instances highlight
the delicate balance that an institution charged with both defending laws and the constitution must
strike, and how a slight move in one direction on the continuum can be the catalyst for widespread
controversy.
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2. Proposed Legislation
The attorney general's position when it comes to answering consti-
tutional questions about proposed or pending legislation is even more
complicated because of the myriad ways in which the office can be con-
fronted with questions during the pre-enactment period. In analyzing
pending legislation, the Office of the Attorney General is obligated to
conduct an independent inquiry into a proposed law's constitutionality.6 6
In these circumstances, we are not acting as advocates defending existing
state law, in which case like courts we give deference to the judgment of
the legislators and governor. The office is acting first as an advisor to the
policy branches, bringing constitutional questions to their attention. In
doing so, 6 7 we do not apply a presumption of constitutionality to pro-
posed legislation or demand that it be shown to be unconstitutional be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, were the office to analyze pending bills with a presumption
in favor of the bill rather than the constitution, we would undermine the
very basis for the presumption of constitutionality given by courts; the
presumption is rooted in the "foundational premise" that the legislative
and executive branches "observe and effectuate constitutional provisions
in exercising their power."68 Therefore, the attorney general's analysis,
while guided by court precedents and other input, is not an attempt to
predict what a court would do if faced with a challenge to the law or an
effort to put forth a defense or attack of the legislation.6 9 This is a de
novo inquiry into a proposal's constitutionality, and the office's conclu-
sion is my independent understanding of how the constitution applies to
the proposed legislation.70
66. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1229 ("[I]t is the function of the Attorney General . . . to protect
the rights of the public . . . ." (second and third alteration in original) (quoting People v. Tool, 86 P.
224, 227 (Colo. 1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. See infra Part II.C.
68. City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440
(Colo. 2000).
69. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Symposium, Constitutional "Niches": The Role of Institutional
Context in Constitutional Law: Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Execu-
tive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1604 (2007). Johnsen argues that in providing opinions, law-
yers representing the executive branch
should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will
constrain the administration's pursuit of desired policies. The advocacy model of lawyer-
ing, in which lawyers craft merely plausible legal arguments to support their clients' de-
sired actions, inadequately promotes the President's constitutional obligation to ensure
the legality of executive action.
Id.
70. In some instances, people within or without the government suggest that whatever the
substantive answer to a constitutional question, the state may be able to effectively avoid liability by
asserting various technical arguments based on the rules of standing. Such arguments are of course
quite proper when defending the state in litigation, but consideration of ways to evade review are
inappropriate at the stage of trying to determine, and assist the other representatives of the people
determine, whether a proposal would violate the constitution. To the contrary, when there is a chance
that legislative action could evade the check ofjudicial review, it is incumbent on those involved in
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With no presumption, we are essentially putting the standard in the
middle of the continuums shown in Part I above. (We often will also note
other constitutional questions that a proposal may present, even if we
think they fall further to the left of the continuum.)
Even if our best judgment is that the law may violate a constitution-
al provision, in the ordinary case we will nevertheless advise the execu-
tive branch officials or legislators involved that it is their decision to
make, and that we will defend the law if they do enact it. At first glance
this may be surprising, but in our view there is no better alternative. The
alternative-refusing to defend any law about which we have strong
doubts-would, as discussed above, put the Attorney General's Office in
an institutional position that conflicts with the role as envisioned by the
constitution and state statutes. Our role is generally to provide candid
advice and then to defend the judgment of the policy branches.
There are, however, exceptions to this usual course. One is if we
conclude that the law is so clearly unconstitutional that it is simply inde-
fensible as written. If we would refuse to defend the law if it were to be
passed (under the highly-deferential standards discussed in II.B. 1 above),
then we believe we have an obligation to notify the policy branches of
that fact before they pass the law. We generally provide this information
behind the scenes; our hope is that this would cause those branches to
reconsider their efforts to pass a law of such dubious constitutionality.
And indeed more often than not the constitutional difficulties are re-
moved from bills before they go forward.
The second exception occurs in more difficult, closer cases when
we believe the proposed law is more likely than not unconstitutional, but
not so defective as to be completely indefensible. In terms of the contin-
uums above, these might fall somewhere between 6 and 8 These are pro-
posals that we likely would defend if they were already law, but that we
feel are likely to transgress some constitutional provision. Normally, we
will not make this position public, for the reasons discussed above: our
job is normally to advise the policy branches, and then to defend the
choices they make.
Sometimes, however, we feel it is necessary to make our position
public. Given that the attorney general also owes a duty to the public-
indeed a duty that the supreme court has noted can supersede its duty to
the legislative process to be more careful that their action complies with constitutional requirements,
not less. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("It must be remembered that, even where parties have no standing to sue, members of
the Legislative and Executive Branches are not excused from making constitutional determinations
in the regular course of their duties. Government officials must make a conscious decision to obey
the Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law and then must conform
their actions to these principled determinations.").
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the policy branches and the government7 -the office sometimes decides
that its conclusion that a proposed law is flawed must be exposed to the
public.
This could happen if we receive a request for a formal opinion on
the constitutional question from one of the institutional "clients"-other
state agencies-the office serves.72 It also may happen if, in effect, the
people of Colorado-which the Salazar Court recognized are the attor-
ney general's other clients 7 3-are entitled to our opinion. Where the of-
fice determines that its role as counsel to the government so conflicts
with its Salazar duty to protect the rights of the public, then it must give
no deference or apply no presumptions in favor of the policy branches.
Rather, it will carry out its duty to its ultimate client-the People-by
announcing its determination that a proposed law is unconstitutional.
This has come to pass only a handful of times in recent years. One
involved the bill seeking to lift a cap on property taxes that became law
and ultimately the subject of Mesa County Board of County Commis-
sioners v. State,74 the case studied in more depth in subsection D below.
Another example was a proposal to take $500 million from the reserves
of a state-chartered insurance company and use it to balance the state
budget.75 That bill ultimately did not become law, at least in part because
the attorney general had declared that it was beyond what the office
could defend.7 6
Probably the most famous example of a Colorado attorney general
stepping in this manner is the subject of People ex rel. Salazar v. Da-
vidson.77 There, Attorney General Salazar not only opposed a bill passed
by the general assembly and signed by the governor, he took the extraor-
dinary step of suing the institutions that normally were his office's cli-
ents to block the law. The current office may not have agreed with his
analysis of the legal issue, or with his decision to take that extraordinary
step of suing to overturn a state law-the office has never done so since,
even when we have disagreed with a law-but we do believe Attorney
71. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1229 ("[l]t is the function of the Attorney General ... to protect
the rights of the public . . . ." (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Tool, 86 P. at 227
(Colo. 1905)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. This can also occur if we are asked to testify
before the legislature on a constitutional question. This has happened on numerous occasions, in-
volving issues such as voting for paroled felons. See Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 688, 689 (Colo.
2006).
73. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1229.
74. 203 P.3d 519 (Colo. 2009).
75. See Tim Hoover, Pinnacol Blasted for Pay, Offices, Legislators Press to Seize $500
Million, Challenging Spending by the Workers' Comp Fund in a Fight Growing Uglier, DENVER
POST, Apr. 15, 2009, at Al.
76. See Tim Hoover, AG Says Pinnacol Assets Off-Limits a Lawsuit over Efforts to Balance
the Budget May Be Inevitable, DENVER POST, Apr. I1, 2009, at Al.
77. 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003).
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General Salazar had the authority to make that decision, as the supreme
court held.78
In practice, there is probably something of a sliding scale involving
both these factors at work: the more debatable the constitutional question
(the closer to the center or left side of the continuums above), the more
powerful the public's claim to our counsel must be before we make pub-
lic our position. On the other end of the scale, the more indefensible a
law (the further right it falls on the continuums), the more likely we are
to make our position public. However the calculation is made, it is only
in rare circumstances that this office has or will take steps to block pro-
posed legislation unless it is well to the extreme right of the constitution-
ality continuums.
In sum, both courts and the Attorney General's Office generally ap-
ply two standards to constitutional questions that are very much alike, if
not identical. When the political branches have passed a law, both the
attorney general and the judiciary presume that those branches have
made a serious constitutional inquiry and found no deficiencies. The
attorney general and the judiciary therefore will only disagree and refuse
to defend or refuse to uphold an existing law if in their judgment the law
falls so far to the unconstitutional end of the continuum discussed above
that there can be no doubt about its violation. On the other hand, before a
proposal or bill has become law, both courts and the attorney general
have no reason to apply a presumption of constitutionality, and should
therefore answer constitutional questions with no deference to the beliefs
of the political branches.
This makes sense. There would be little benefit to the attorney gen-
eral publicly declaring that an existing law is likely unconstitutional. The
law is already in place and is unlikely to be repealed. The courts are
well-positioned-much better positioned than the Attorney General's
Office-to review such laws and make the ultimate decision about their
constitutionality. But when the law is still being debated, it can be
amended to fix any flaws the Attorney General's Office finds, or dropped
entirely, or passed, but at least with the understanding that it may cause
costly litigation.
While ethical rules and case law make clear that the attorney gen-
eral has a bit more freedom to take positions contrary to his institutional
"clients" wishes,79 the system would cease to function if the attorney
general could block or refuse to defend any law he questions. The
countermajoritarian problem is not present-or at least lessenedso-since
78. See id. at 1229-30; see also supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
79. See Salazar, 79 P.3d at 1231; COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.13 cmt. 9 (2011).
80. Of course, if the attorney general is ever in disagreement with a majority of the legislature
and the governor, it could be said there is a countermajoritarian aspect to his behavior. But the more
serious countermajoritarian problem is not where government institutions may act contrary to the
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the attorney general is elected. But there are other problems that prevent
us from vigorously standing against those branches, even if we think
their laws may be, or even likely should be, considered to transgress the
constitution.
First, unlike courts, whose nature essentially requires them to "say
what the law is" and thus declare statutes unconstitutional,8 1 the nature of
the attorney general does not require it to play such a role. Instead, the
office's main roles are to be the chief law enforcement officer of the
state, to assist the rest of the executive branch to understand and execute
the laws, and to defend those laws when challenged. While one could
devise a system in which the attorney general was something of an advi-
sory court, empowered to issue public opinions on the constitutionality
of every proposed or existing law, and to apply a non-deferential stand-
ard in arriving at those opinions, it is not the system we have here. Such
a system would be hard to square with the attorney general's obligation
to defend the laws of the state and serve as the legal advisor to most state
812agencies. To carry further the analogy to criminal trials discussed above
in Part I, like individuals accused of violating the law, laws accused of
violating the constitution deserve a vigorous defense. The institution on
wishes of an elected branch of government in a given instance, which would describe this situation.
The more serious problem decried by Bickel and Nagel arises where a majority of the people has
little or no recourse to check the government actors or institutions in question, who therefore may
continually flout majority will. See BICKEL, supra note 30, at 31; NAGEL, supra note 28, at 22-26.
That problem exists for courts much more so than for an elected attorney general, although there is at
least some theoretical democratic check in Colorado even on our state courts, which have to stand
for retention elections. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1335, 1339-40 (2001) ("The countermajoritarian difficulty surfaces in Court decisions because
the Justices have little competence at discerning popular views and no accountability for the judg-
ments they render.").
81. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
82. One irony, or at least one surprising result of this conclusion is that in many ways a sepa-
rate elected attorney general such as that in Colorado may have less ability to exert control over
potentially unconstitutional (or otherwise unwise) actions of the policy branches (in particular the
executive) than would an appointed attorney general in the federal system. Where the attorney gen-
eral is appointed by the chief executive, the attorney general is typically empowered with the final
say on legal matters, including whether and how to interpret and implement statutes, rules, and
regulations, and whether to proceed with litigation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2006) ("[T]he Attor-
ney General shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a
party . . . ."). In the divided executive system, however, while the attorney general may offer advice
and occasionally refuse to defend a law or regulation, for the reasons explained here, that is unlikely
to happen except in very rare circumstances. And even when the attorney general does so, the gover-
nor may hire her own counsel to carry on without the attorney general. Of course, in the unitary
executive model, to the extent the chief executive and attorney general actually disagree on major
matters, the chief executive's opinion will carry the day. See John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus
Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 799, 803-04 (1992) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION (1991), and discussing the solicitor general's role which is analogous to the attorney
general's position). But many legal decisions are made at lower levels than the chief executive, and
in those situations the unitary executive may, paradoxically, allow for the attorney general's legal
advice to be more independent and carry more weight than it does in the divided system discussed
herein. See Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on Defending Marriage Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3-4 (2011) (statement of Edward Whelan,
President, Ethics and Public Policy Center).
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whom it falls to provide that defense in Colorado is the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, whether the attorney general thinks the law may be "guilty"
or not.83
And perhaps most importantly, there is no societal consensus that
the attorney general should take a more active role in serving as a consti-
tutional gatekeeper; for the most part, the office's ultimate client-the
people of Colorado-appears to prefer the current system, in which the
office steps in only in the very rare circumstances described above. This
institutional balance is not ideal, but it is in our view the best among
nonideal options. But it must be acknowledged that it means that, like the
courts, the Attorney General's Office is rarely in a position to block or
even to refuse to defend laws that it may believe are unconstitutional. It
is only when the law is well to the extreme right of the continuum de-
scribed above that the office will seek to do so. Thus, the office will de-
fend many laws and proposals that the office finds of questionable, or
even doubtful, constitutionality.
C. The Policy Branches
It is, of course, when the policy branches consider and act upon leg-
islative proposals that constitutional questions first arise. And because
the other institutions are so deferential, it is also within the policy
branches that careful scrutiny of those questions is perhaps most im-
portant. But as with the attorney general and unlike the judiciary, how
those branches answer those questions is, not well-known or remarked
upon. In part this is due to the fact that, just as in some sense it is impos-
sible to say there is any uniform intent behind a legislative act,84 it is
probably impossible to declare that there is any one standard used by the
members of the policy branches in answering constitutional questions.
Every legislator and every governor answers the questions in her own
way. Members of the policy branches also have no obligation to put into
writing the standards they use. And it seems likely that even individuals
may use different standards at different times.s
Nevertheless, we can make at least a few assertions about the pro-
cess as it often occurs. First, unlike either the judiciary or the attorney
general, the policy branches typically only confront constitutional ques-
83. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-51-115 (2011) ("[I1f the statute, ordinance, or franchise
is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state shall also be served with a copy of
the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.").
84. See Dan Domenico, Deference and Legislative Intent, DULR ONUNE (Feb. 16, 2011, 1:02
PM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/practitioners-pieces/2011/2/16/deference-and-legislative-
intent.html.
85. Cf Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1994) (holding that there are multiple accepta-
ble definitions of a "reasonable doubt").
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tions before a bill becomes law.86 Second, some members of those
branches appear to believe that it is the role of others (especially the
courts) to answer constitutional questions while the policy branches con-
cern themselves only with policy. 8 7 It is worth noting that this phenome-
non does not appear to be one limited to a particular party or to Colora-
889
do," or even to the modern era.
Finally, we know that in Colorado, when the legislature does seek
legal advice on constitutional questions, the answers it receives are based
upon applying a somewhat deferential standard. The legislature has its
own lawyers in the Office of Legislative Legal Services (OLLS). These
lawyers are among the few attorneys authorized by law to provide legal
services to state entities who do not work in the Office of the Attorney
General.
OLLS reviews various legal questions for the legislature, including
constitutional questions. At least when it makes its decisions public, the
standard OLLS applies is stated as follows: "OLLS legal memoranda
generally resolve doubts about whether the general assembly has authori-
ty to enact a particular piece of legislation in favor of the general assem-
bly's plenary power." 90 Taken to its extreme this could mean that OLLS's
standard falls at the far right of the continuums above-that it defers to
the legislature unless it has absolutely no doubt about a law's unconstitu-
tionality. This seems unlikely to be the actual case, and in practice it ap-
pears more likely that OLLS's standard mirrors that of the courts, and in
fact, the standard appears to incorporate the courts' standard by seeking
to predict how courts would treat the law if it went into effect.9'
The stated reasons for using this deferential standard include that it
is "[c]onsistent with the OLLS' position as a staff agency of the general
86. It could be said that the governor will face different questions when implementing a law
that has been passed, but to the extent that is so, the governor and the attorney general will typically
be working together.
87. See Neomi Rao, The Constitution: Not Just for Courts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011, at
A15; Katyal, supra note 80, at 1350-51 (arguing that Congress is the best institution for abstract
constitutional interpretation).
88. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Breaking Constitutional Faith: Presi-
dent Bush and Campaign Finance Reform, FINDLAW (Apr. 5, 2002),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20020405.html (criticizing President George W. Bush for signing
into law a bill he had repeatedly stated contained provisions violating the First Amendment).
89. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) ("In 1789,.. . a Member of
the House of Representatives objected to a debate on the constitutionality of legislation based on the
theory that 'it would be officious' to consider the constitutionality of a measure that did not affect
the House ..... (quoting I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 500 (1789)).
90. Memorandum from Office of Legislative Legal Servs. to Keith King, Colo. House Repre-
sentative I n.l (April 7, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 OLLS Memo], available at
www.lobbycolorado.com/FileRepository/documents/AttachmentA.pdf.
91. See, e.g., Memorandum from Office of Legislative Legal Servs. to Sue Windels, Colo.
State Senator 2 (March 28, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 OLLS Memo], available at
http://www.lobbycolorado.com/FileRepository/documents/LegalServicesMemo.pdf ("If enacted, the
[law in question] would be presumed constitutional and, if challenged, the [law] would have to be
proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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assembly." 92 Moreover, OLLS's "analysis starts with the general princi-
ple that the general assembly has plenary authority to legislate."9 It also
is inspired by the very deferential stance that the courts give to the legis-
lature's enactments.9 4 Whatever the reasons, it leads to legislators basing
decisions not on the law's constitutionality, but on its "riskiness"--that
is, they effectively, if not explicitly ask, themselves not if a law is consti-
tutional but if it will be upheld by the courts.95
This means that, like the judiciary and attorney general, OLLS takes
a deferential stance on constitutional questions. And again, by applying a
deferential standard-by putting the tipping point on the right side of the
continuum-these institutions are not actually asking if laws are consti-
tutional. This is certainly not to say that the legislators or the governor
often will intentionally vote for or sign laws they know to be unconstitu-
tional,9 but just to point out that they do not formally ask that question.
By asking instead whether doubts can be resolved in favor of the policy
branches, this deferential standard (just as it does when the institutions
discussed above apply deferential standards) ensures that some number
of bills about which significant constitutional doubt exists within the
policy branches will nevertheless be "approved" for passage.
D. Case Study: Mesa County Board of Commissioners v. State
The principles and practices all came to the fore in the recent case
of Mesa County Board of Commissioners v. State. Taking a closer look at
the development of that case and the statute it involved can highlight
how the actions of the various entities in question were guided by the
standards they have chosen to apply and how those standards can alter
the outcome of a constitutional question.
The details of the law in question are fairly complex and are de-
scribed in detail in the various memoranda and opinions cited below.97
For purposes of this Article, however, the following is relevant:
- Colorado's constitution, in the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights
(TABOR), declares that "[D]istricts must have voter approval in advance
for . . . any new tax, tax rate increase, mill levy above that for the prior
year, valuation for assessment ratio increase for a property class, or ex-
92. See 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at I n. 1.
93. 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91, at 4.
94. See 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at 6-8 (analyzing the question by asking how the
court would analyze this issue).
95. See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Lawmakers Scrap Plan to Tap Pinnacol Funds, DENVER POST
(Apr. 15, 2009, 9:43 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12147139?source-pkg (quoting lawmaker
explaining his decision not to pursue a questionable bill because "we've all come to the conclusion
that it . .. would be risky").
96. See Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 525 (Colo. 2009).
97. See, e.g., id. at 524-27.
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tension of an expiring tax, or a tax policy change directly causing a net
tax revenue gain to any district."98
'Prior to 2007, a state statute effectively capped local school dis-
trict property tax revenue.
O When property values rose quickly, as they often did, the statute
thus resulted over time in local districts having to lower their property
tax rates (called "mill levies") so as not to exceed the revenue limits.
D In 2007, the state legislature and the governor proposed repealing
the state statutory limit on property tax revenue. Under this proposal, tax
rates that would have been forced downward under the existing statute
would remain the same, and revenues would thus increase.
After a short debate, the policy branches passed the bill (SB 199)
and signed it into law. Soon thereafter, a group of citizens, businesses,
taxpayers, and local governments sued, alleging that the removal of the
state property tax limit violated TABOR. The plaintiffs prevailed at the
district court level. 99 On appeal, however, the supreme court reversed and
upheld the law. 00
In this process, each of the institutions examined in this Article car-
ried out its role and applied the standards described above. In many
ways, therefore, the case was highly typical. In three ways, however, it
was atypical: first, where in the usual case only the courts make their
analysis of a constitutional question explicit and public, in this case each
institution did so; second, and even more unusually, in this case the At-
torney General's Office was so certain that the proposed law was uncon-
stitutional that it went even beyond the very lenient standard we adopt on
the constitutional continuum; finally, the reviewing courts disagreed on
the proper standard to apply to the law, with the district court applying a
lower bar for the challengers (that is, a more stringent review of the law's
constitutionality) than the usual highly deferential beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard that the supreme court applied. All of these unusual cir-
cumstances put into relief how choosing a particular standard can alter
the outcome of an institution's analysis of a constitutional question, and
can show how the usual standards can interact with each other to create a
feedback loop.
1. The Policy Branches
When the bill was proposed, legislators sought the advice of the
OLLS. That office specifically answered the question. In doing so, it
98. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a).
99. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Colo. Dep't of Educ., No. 07CV12064, at 14 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. May 30, 2008), http://www.coloradoattomeygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/2008/
06/02/.pdf.
100. Mesa Cnty., 203 P.3d at 522-23.
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applied the deferential standard noted above: its "position [was] to re-
solve doubts about whether the general assembly has authority to enact a
particular piece of legislation in favor of the general assembly's plenary
power" and that "if challenged, the repeal would have to be proven un-
constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."' 0 ' That is, it applied at least a
somewhat deferential standard-a 6 or 7 on the continuum, perhaps.
OLLS noted that at least one issue was a close call: whether SB 07-199
constituted a "tax policy change." 02
The governor's counsel also provided an analysis of the question,
which mirrored the OLLS analysis fairly closely. It too appeared to apply
a deferential standard.10 3 These analyses tracked a prior OLLS memoran-
dum on the same basic question.' 0
2. The Attorney General
Given the high-profile and controversial nature of the proposed law,
the attorney general assigned me to analyze the bill's constitutionality. It
was in setting out to do so that the questions that this paper seeks to an-
swer began to crystallize. When the attorney general asked for my analy-
sis, I had to ask him what precisely he wanted me to analyze-that is,
what question was I to answer. In reading the memoranda of the policy
branches, I was struck that they did not seem to be answering directly the
important question: is the bill constitutional? Instead, the question
seemed to be whether the law was likely to be upheld in court. This can
be an important question, but it is not the only question one can ask in
these situations, as already discussed.'05 The attorney general and I dis-
cussed the possible approaches and he instructed me to proceed without
any presumptions or weighted deference, answering simply whether I
believed the law was constitutional or not. This is what I did.10 6
Thus, though we were not quite thinking in these terms at the time,
our office applied essentially the neutral, 50/50 tipping point on the con-
tinuum, a five out of ten, while the policy branches used more deferential
standards common to litigation, perhaps in the 7-9 range.10 7 This may
have made the difference in our different conclusions.
101. 2007 OLLS Memo, supra, note 91, at 2.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Letter from Thomas M. Rogers IlI, Chief Counsel to the Colo. Governor to Sue Windels,
Colo. State Senator 6 (Mar. 20, 2007) (on file with author).
104. 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at I n.1.
105. See, e.g., Holder Letter, supra note 2.
106. See Memorandum from Dan Domenico, Colo. Solicitor Gen. to John Suthers, Colo. At-
torney Gen. 11 (April 27, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Suthers Memo].
107. See 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91, at 2 ("If enacted, the [law in question] would be
presumed constitutional and, if challenged, the [law] would have to be proven unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also 2004 OLLS Memo, supra note 90, at 6 ("Only when the state
constitution directly or indirectly addresses the limits of legislative power or when the judiciary
defines the extent of that power in the context of a particular decision are the boundaries precisely
known.").
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Like those branches, I concluded that SB 07-199 did not appear to
transgress most of the potentially relevant provisions of TABOR.'08 In
my view, while there might have been colorable claims under those pro-
visions, they would not have reached the middle of our continuum. Both
OLLS and I acknowledged that there was one constitutional question that
was truly problematic: the provision of TABOR barring a "tax policy
change directly causing a net revenue gain to any district."1 09 OLLS not-
ed that this was a close question, but concluded that because the law was
being changed mainly in order to address school finance issues, it was
not a "tax policy" and thus TABOR did not apply. The governor's coun-
sel advanced a somewhat different analysis, acknowledging that the law
in question involved "tax policy" but arguing that the bill did "not consti-
tute a 'change' in tax policy." Our conclusion was that this was indeed a
close case-particularly under the presumptions OLLS applies. That is, I
would have agreed that it would be a very difficult call to say whether
the law's questionable constitutionality surpassed the 8 or 9 or so that the
policy branches were using as their standard. But at the more stringent 5,
that the attorney general and I determined was appropriate for our analy-
sis, it was clear that SB 07-199 was beyond our standard. Thus, I con-
cluded in my memorandum to him that "[m]y best judgment is that this
proposal requires voter approval under the Constitution." 0
The attorney general concurred. The next, and more difficult, ques-
tion for us was what to do with our analysis. As discussed above, we
often provide such analyses of constitutional questions confidentially to
the governor's office or to relevant legislators. Here, however, we decid-
ed that would be inappropriate. This was the unusual situation where our
obligations to the people of the state prevailed over our obligation to
institutional clients such as the governor, the legislature, or any state
agency.
A number of factors were weighed in this decision. First, the very
short timeline in which the proposal was to be considered before the end
of the legislative session meant that it was highly unlikely that our office
could have time to conduct the sort of back-and-forth efforts to clear up
constitutional problems with bills that typically takes place with the poli-
cy branches."' The fact that the policy branches had each already con-
108. See, e.g., 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91 at 1-2 ("The [law in question] clearly does
not constitute a new tax, tax rate increase, mill levy above that for the prior year, valuation for as-
sessment ratio increase for a property class, or extension of an expiring tax for purposes of the voter
approval requirement of section 20(4)(a) of article X of the state constitution.").
109. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a). I also concluded that the law may have been a weak-
ening of "[o]ther limits on district revenue, spending, and debt" that required voter approval. See
Suthers Memo, supra, note 106, at 9. It is unnecessary for purposes of this article to analyze that
question.
110. See id. at 11.
Ill. The author would like to note, perhaps a bit defensively, that because of the sudden intro-
duction of the bill, our analysis (that of the Solicitor General's office) was undertaken beginning on
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ducted their own legal analyses and made them public also suggested
that they were not relying on our office to provide this function in this
instance. The people, on the other hand, were quite interested in the is-
sue, as calls and other correspondence to the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral revealed, but had no independent institutional legal representation.
Given all these factors, the attorney general decided we were obligated in
this case to provide our analysis to the public.
The result was that, after providing the governor with a copy of our
analysis1 2 and a day's notice, we released our conclusion to the public.
This set off something of a controversy, with some support and some
criticism, as was to be expected. Of course, much of the controversy was
over the substantive analysis, which is understandable though not partic-
ularly relevant to this Article. Much of the controversy, however, was
based on a failure to understand two things this Article seeks to help ex-
plain: the different legal standards state institutions can and do apply to
constitutional questions, and the role of the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral as both counsel to the state government and as legal representative of
the state's citizens. Other similar decisions by other attorneys general
have likewise triggered much criticism, also at least in part due to confu-
sion about these structural issues.'i 3
3. The Courts
Not surprisingly, the law was swiftly challenged in court. The plain-
tiffs prevailed in the district court. Importantly, the district court's view
of a particular interpretive guide included in TABOR itself altered the
usual judicial standard of review it should apply:
Further, TABOR itself includes the provision requiring that [i]ts pre-
ferred interpretation shall reasonably restrain most the growth of
government.
Inclusion of this interpretation expressly in TABOR removes this
case, in the Court's view, from the generally accepted standard of re-
view requiring that those advancing the unconstitutionality of a given
statute must prove its unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable
doubt." However, as the Colorado Supreme Court has noted that
while ordinarily a party challenging a statute as unconstitutional
bears the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality beyond a rea-
a Tuesday and was released on Thursday. I stand by the analysis and conclusions, but simply note
that with a bit more time, they could have been fleshed out and perhaps more elegantly expressed.
112. Letter from John W. Suthers, Colo. Attorney Gen. to Bill Ritter, Colo. Governor (Apr. 27,
2007) (on file with author).
113. See, e.g., Holder Letter, supra, note 2 (notifying Speaker Boehner that the Department of
Justice believes Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional, and therefore will no
longer be defended by the Department of Justice); see also People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79
P.3d 1221, 1225 (Colo. 2003) (stating that the Colorado Attorney General's interpretation of the




sonable doubt, the "type of constitutional challenge, the nature of the
challenged statute, and the standing of the parties determine how we
approach judicial review in a particular case, such as the one before
us." Accordingly, this Court concludes that the relevant standard of
review requires the Court to give preference to interpretations of
TABOR that "restrain most the growth of government."'
1 4
Applying this standard-perhaps a 5 or even lower on the constitu-
tional continuum described above-the district court concluded that SB
07-199 violated TABOR.' 15 The supreme court reversed, the majority
emphasizing that its disagreement with the district court was as much
about the proper standard to apply as about the merits of the constitution-
al question:
When it issued its declaratory judgment order, the district court did
not have the benefit of our recent decision in Barber v. Ritter, in
which we held that a statute challenged under article X, section 20
must be proven to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court erroneously held that the relevant test of SB 07-199's
constitutionality came from the interpretive guideline included in the
text of article X, section 20 to "reasonably restrain most the growth
of government."',
16
Applying the more deferential standard, the supreme court upheld
SB 07-199.
4. The Feedback Loop in Practice
The purpose of highlighting the Mesa County case in this Article is
not to relitigate the case, or to call into question the various standards
applied by the institutional players. The dual purposes are rather to show
the different standards institutions use in answering difficult constitu-
tional questions-the different locations on the continuum they choose to
draw their lines, and to emphasize the often-pivotal impact that where
they choose to draw those lines can have on the outcome of their analysis
and thus on the constitutional fate of a legislative proposal or law. Ulti-
mately, the case shows how those choices can cause what this Article
calls the constitutional feedback loop.
In this case, the policy branches and the supreme court applied
highly deferential standards to the question of SB 07-199's compatibility
with TABOR. As discussed above, these standards could translate into
points on the continuum in the 7-9 range. The Attorney General's Office
114. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Colo. Dep't of Educ., No. 07CV12064, at 11 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. May 30, 2008), http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press releases/2008/
06/02/.pdf (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 14.
116. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 523 (Colo. 2009); see also id at 527,
536 (emphasizing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard); id at 539 (Eid, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the "the highly deferential approach articulated by the majority").
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and the district court (for different reasons) applied less deferential
standards, in the 4-5 range. It should be no surprise then that in a diffi-
cult case, the standards may have made the difference. If we (surely
counterfactually) assume that every institution involved here objectively
believed the law was slightly more likely unconstitutional than constitu-
tional-a 6.5, say, on the continuum-then each of the institutions would
still have arrived at the same conclusion it did. The policy branches, re-
solving their "1.5 points worth" of doubt into their presumption would
still have concluded that the bill could proceed. The supreme court's
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard has at least that much room for
doubt, and would have upheld the law. The attorney general and the dis-
trict court, giving no benefit of the doubt, would still have concluded that
the law went beyond their standards.
On the other hand, had the supreme court elected to follow the dis-
trict court's analysis of the interpretive language of TABOR and had
chosen to resolve doubts against the bill rather than in its favor, or even
to apply a neutral "5" or minimally deferential "6" on our continuum, the
result would have been different. Under those standards (given our as-
sumed objective 6.5 level of doubt) the supreme court, without changing
its actual analysis of the merits at all, would have affirmed the district
court and held the law unconstitutional.
Thus we see the practical importance of where institutions elect to
draw their lines, and we have seen how and why they choose the various
points on the continuum at which they typically draw those lines. In the
next section of this Article, I will attempt to explain some of the second-
level effects of those choices, and move into a short normative analysis
of whether the system should be and could be improved.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK LOOP
A. How the Feedback Loop Works
The end result of all these standards is that every institution's stand-
ard falls to the right side of the continuum of deference. Every institu-
tion, in other words, asks not whether a law is constitutional, but whether
it is clearly or undoubtedly unconstitutional. This results in a feedback
loop: the attorney general and the courts will defer to the policy branch-
es' constitutional judgments, but the policy branches then take that def-
erence into account in making that judgment themselves. The former two
institutions assume the policy branches have asked the constitutional
question and will uphold the law even if their independent judgment is
that the law is probably (though not undoubtedly) unconstitutional.
Meanwhile, the policy branches look to how the courts will assess the
constitutional question, and thus do not directly ask the constitutional




The result of the feedback loop is that laws that all three branches
might agree have serious constitutional problems-perhaps even some
that all would agree are probably unconstitutional-will be passed by the
legislature, signed by the governor, defended by the attorney general, and
upheld by the courts.
In mathematical terms, if the "beyond a reasonable doubt" line falls
around 75%, 17 then the feedback loop works like this: Imagine that a
neutral body of legal minds, applying no deference or heightened burden,
would assess that Law X is 80% likely to be unconstitutional."' The
policy branches, in considering whether to pass and sign the law, first
would resolve doubts in their own favor. If that alone were the question
the policy branches asked, this would likely result in these branches not
passing the law. As discussed above, even a presumption of constitution-
ality does not mean resolving all doubts, even extreme doubts, and we
can assume 80% is beyond even the level of doubt the policy branches
would accept. But, as just discussed, the policy branches do not actually
ask what is the likelihood a law is unconstitutional; they ask what is the
likelihood the courts will strike it down. And since the courts ask only
whether a law has been proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt, the deference essentially gets multiplied. The legislature will take
the .80 chance the law is unconstitutional and multiply it by the .80
chance that the courts will find it unconstitutional, and arrive at .64.
Thus, a law that would have fallen outside even the highly deferential
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard (set here at .75) is now within the
standard and would likely be passed by the policy branches.
The 2007 OLLS Memo from the Mesa County case study appears to
make this feedback loop explicit. As noted above, OLLS began with a
deferential standard ("to resolve doubts about whether the general as-
sembly has authority to enact a particular piece of legislation in favor of
the general assembly's plenary power"). This is questionable in itself.
But then OLLS went on to incorporate into its analysis the additionally
deferential standard that court apply ("if challenged, the repeal would
have to be proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt"). Thus, it
seems that the question the legislature is asking is not whether the law is
unconstitutional, or even whether it is clearly unconstitutional, but
whether there are doubts about whether the courts will uphold the law.
Thus, the deference the courts grant the legislature itself becomes part of
the policy branches' analysis, and they ask not whether the law is consti-
tutional, but whether the courts will uphold it. As explained above, these
are very different things in our deferential world.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
118. One might imagine arriving at such an assessment by polling the group, and having 80%
declare the law is unconstitutional while 20% declare it constitutional.
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So even if everyone agrees that the issues discussed in subpart I(B)
above justify a generally deferential approach to constitutional ques-
tions-that indeed, some unconstitutional laws be allowed to go "free"
lest one constitutional one be blocked; this feedback loop shows that the
current system may allow more to go free than anyone suggests is opti-
mal. The section below discusses what, if anything, can be done about it.
B. Can the Loop be Broken?
The ultimate goal of the system as a whole should be to minimize
two types of errors: erroneously allowing unconstitutional laws to be-
come and remain law (which may be referred to as "mistaken lenity"),
and erroneously preventing laws that would be constitutional from taking
effect ("mistaken obstruction"). Of course, there is a tradeoff among the
two-the more careful one is about the former, the harder it is to protect
against the latter and vice versa.
Part II shows that all of the actors in our system have arrived, by de-
sign or otherwise, at points on the continuum of constitutionality that
heavily protect against mistaken obstruction; the inevitable conclusion is
that they thereby will make mistakes of lenity more often. As that discus-
sion shows, there are powerful reasons in our democratic society to pre-
fer this outcome-to be more worried about erroneously blocking laws
than about erroneously allowing them to pass, and therefore, this bias
may be proper.
At the same time it is worrisome that only rarely does any state ac-
tor actually ask if a law is constitutional before they enact, sign, defend,
or uphold it. In general, however, there is little that can be done, particu-
larly by the courts or the attorney general, to alter this imperfect system
without causing more harm than it would prevent. Given the author's
position as solicitor general, it is hardly surprising that I do not believe
there is much that can be done to alter the role of the attorney general in
this process. If I did, I would have sought to do so internally. It is certain-
ly tempting to argue that our office should take a more forceful role in
challenging and questioning the other branches' constitutional judgment.
And given the institutional independence of the state attorney general,
doing so would not be entirely without constitutional justification. But
the position described in subpart 1(B) is a delicate balance of that inde-
pendence and the fundamental role of the office as counselor and advo-
cate for the state's laws and agencies. Without additional constitutional
changes further empowering the attorney general to make independent
constitutional judgments, there is little that our office can do to alter the
current system.
Similarly, there is little the judiciary can do substantively that would
not cause more institutional problems than it would solve. For all the
reasons discussed in subpart II(A), the courts simply must give the policy
branches some deference and uphold duly-enacted laws unless doubts
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about their constitutionality substantially outweigh arguments in their
favor. I do believe that the system would benefit, however, if the judici-
ary were to adopt a stated standard that more closely reflects its actual
approach. One need not necessarily agree with Justice Eid that the su-
preme court selectively applies the beyond a reasonable doubt burden to
understand that in practice the court's standard is usually far lower than
what it would allow a jury to apply in a criminal case. 9 In most cases,
the court seems to apply a standard nearer to a preponderance or, at most,
clear and convincing level (in the 5.5-7.5 or 55-75% range on the nu-
merical scales). Making this explicit would not only aid litigants in
properly understanding how the courts approach constitutional questions,
it would help to alleviate the effects of the feedback loop because the
policy branches (and the Office of the Attorney General) would better
understand the deference they get from the judiciary.12 0 More accurately
describing the courts' actual standards would also make easier the more
significant recommendations urged upon the policy branches below.
The policy branches could break the feedback loop by making two
changes to the way they ask their attorneys to answer constitutional ques-
tions. First, they should not ask what the judiciary is likely to do should
the law be challenged in court. This aspect of the analysis is simply inap-
propriate in answering the bare question: Is this proposed law constitu-
tional? Since the judiciary itself will give the policy branches a strong
degree of deference, what courts will do is by definition not a guide to
actual constitutionality. The combination of the courts' deference with
the policy branches' looking to the courts for guidance is what exacer-
bates the issues that deference itself creates and turns them into a feed-
back loop. Instead, the policy branches should make an independent
analysis of any constitutional questions.
Second, in doing so, the policy branches should not "resolve any
doubts in favor of upholding the legislature's action."' 2 1 Given the pow-
erful deference that the other institutions give to the policy branches,
those branches should resolve questions instead by resolving significant
doubts against their own exercise of power. In other words, the policy
branches should draw their line at the middle or to the left of center on
the continuums above. This is the only way to prevent the number of
119. See Mesa Cnty, 203 P.3d at 539 (Eid, J., dissenting).
120. This question has been explored elsewhere. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, Friction by
Design: The Necessary Contest of State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 571, 603 (2009) ("Too much deference to state legislative power renders constitutional
imitations meaningless . .. . Too little deference to state legislative power erodes its presumptively
plenary nature and creates ample grounds for political and interbranch conflict over the parameters
of particular limitations."); F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1458-59 (2010) ("[C]ourts would overturn legislation only if it was
based on a clearly mistaken, irrational interpretation of the Constitution."); Robert A. Schapiro,
Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 656, 715 (2000) (advocating a "contextual approach" to judicial deference).
121. Contra Schapiro, supra note 120, at 694.
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unconstitutional laws that go into effect from outpacing the justifiable
number in a polity that can legitimately be said to be governed by a con-
stitution.
Perhaps the best place to draw that line would be as an inverse of
the standard used by the courts. If the courts will uphold a law unless it is
shown to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, the policy
branches ought to refrain from enacting the law unless they find it is con-
stitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Again in terms of the continuums,
if the courts put the number at an 8 on the right side of the continuum,
the policy branches should use something close to the 2 on the left.
In practice, this would not affect the great run of constitutional
questions that are asked and resolved within these various institutions.
But it would alter the conclusion of something like the 2007 OLLS
Memo. There, the policy branches were told by OLLS that the proposed
law presented a "close question",122 but that "if challenged, the [law]
would have to be proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,"
and therefore, OLLS concluded that the law would be upheld.123 Under
this proposal, OLLS would not ask whether the courts were likely or not
to uphold the law, nor would it resolve doubts in favor of constitutionali-
ty. Instead, the analysis would begin by asking whether there were sig-
nificant constitutional questions. Here, since OLLS admitted there were
"close" questions, the answers to the constitutional questions would be
yes. The next question would simply be which side of the selected tip-
ping point on continuum of constitutionality the proposed law fell on.
Assuming that "close" means near to 50/50, then under the "clear and
convincing" standard, OLLS would have to conclude that the law should
not be passed. Only if OLLS could say that the question is "clearly" an-
swered in favor of constitutionality would it recommend passage. Under
the "preponderance" standard it isn't clear what the result would have
been. The analysis would have had to be more specific and robust to re-
solve what side of the line the "close" question fell.124 If those branches
concluded that the law was probably constitutional, then they would pro-
ceed. But if the doubts weighed on the right side of the continuum, then
the conclusion would have to be not to allow the bill to become law.
Were they to do so, it would result in at least one institution asking
whether a law is constitutional-a result that seems entirely to be de-
sired.
If the policy branches refuse to adopt these alterations, it may be
reasonable to conclude that they not only understand the feedback loop
but take advantage of it to implement policies they know may well be
122. See 2007 OLLS Memo, supra note 91, at 2.
123. Id. at 2, 7.
124. This requirement of more specificity and robustness itself is a benefit of this proposed
change, even if it would not alter the ultimate conclusion in any instance.
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unconstitutional. This would undermine the very basis for the deferential
postures the other institutions take to the policy branches' enactments. 125
Therefore, the courts and attorney general might have to consider mov-
ing their tipping points to the left on the continuums above, asserting a
more rigorous method of review.'26
This should not be necessary. Unlike with the judiciary and the at-
torney general, there are no institutional limitations that prevent the poli-
cy branches from adopting and applying this more stringent standard.
Instead, those branches are constrained only by political considerations:
after all, at least in theory, the reason a bill would be passed is because a
majority of citizens or their representatives want it to be. Asking the pol-
icy branches to adopt a proposed standard that would prevent them in
some instances from enacting laws that they or their constituents desire is
of course asking for a significant and perhaps unrealistic amount of self-
restraint. After all, the reason we have constitutions at all is because rely-
ing on the self-restraint of those in power is a fool's errand. 127
So ultimately it may be that the public itself will have to be the "in-
stitution" that applies an undeferential standard to constitutional ques-
tions and will have to restrain their legislators-and themselves-from
seeking laws that transgress the constitution. As Publius recognized, "A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the gov-
ernment."' 28 Nevertheless, the current system is generally unremarked
125. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) ("When Congress acts within its
sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution. This has been clear from the early days of
the Republic. In 1789, when a Member of the House of Representatives objected to a debate on the
constitutionality of legislation based on the theory that 'it would be officious' to consider the consti-
tutionality of a measure that did not affect the House, James Madison explained that 'it is incontro-
vertibly of as much importance to this branch of the Government as to any other, that the constitu-
tion should be preserved entire. It is our duty.' Were it otherwise, we would not afford Congress the
presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy." (quoting I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 500 (1789)).
126. This question has been explored elsewhere. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, Friction by
Design: The Necessary Contest of State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking, 43 U. RIcH.
L. REV. 571, 603 (2009) ("Too much deference to state legislative power renders constitutional
imitations meaningless . . . . Too little deference to state legislative power erodes its presumptively
plenary nature and creates ample grounds for political and interbranch conflict over the parameters
of particular limitations."); F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1447, 1458-59 (2010) ("[C]ourts would overturn legislation only if it was
based on a clearly mistaken, irrational interpretation of the Constitution."); Schapiro, supra note 120,
at 715 (advocating a "contextual approach" to judicial deference). See also Clark Neily & Dick M.
Carpenter II, Government Unchecked: The False Problem of "Judicial Activism" and the Need for
Judicial Engagement, Institute for Justice, at 3, 10 (2011) (arguing that the job of "keeping the other
branches within the bounds of the Constitution and ensuring individual rights are not trampled by
over-reaching government ... cannot be left to policymakers themselves" but that "instead ofjudg-
ment, courts often show reflexive deference to other branches of government".)
127. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Cambridge University Press ed.,
2003) ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.").
128. Id.
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upon, and these minor but potentially important alterations are at least
worth considering and discussing.12 9 If they are rejected, the discussion
would be worthwhile for the institutions of the government and for the
people they represent and serve.
129. Id. ("[E]xperience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.").
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